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This paper presents evidence regarding the two quantitiable components of the costs of going 
publtc: direct expenses and underpricing. Together, these costs average 21.25 of the realized 
market value of the securities issued for firm commitment offers and 31.87% for best efforts otTers. 
For a given size offer. the direct expenses are of the same order of magnitude for both contract 
tcpcs. but the underpricing is greater for best efforts offers. An explanation of why some tirms 
choose to use best efforts offers in spite of their apparent higher total costs is given. 
1. Introduction 
For firms going public, capital markets are not frictionless. In this paper. I 
present evidence on the transaction costs of going public. The two cost 
components that I focus on are the direct costs. which are primarily invest- 
ment banking fees. and the indirect cost of underpricing. Both components are 
economically significant, with the total costs, expressed as a percentage of the 
realized market value of the securities issued, averaging 21.22% for firm 
commitment offers and 3l.S7% for best efforts offers. 
With both types of investment banking contracts. the formal process of 
going public starts when a registration statement, containing descriptive 
material about the issuing firm and the proposed offer, is filed with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). With a firm commitment 
offer, the issuing firm and its investment banker then issue a preliminary 
prospectus and solicit indications of interest from potential investors. Follow- 
ing SEC approval of the offer, the issuing firm and its investment banker hold 
a pricing meeting at which the offer price and the number of shares to be sold 
*Useful comments from E. Han Kim. Saman Majd. Nejat Seyhun, an anonymous referee. and 
Clifford Smith and Michael Jensen (the editors). are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks are 
owed to Harrv DeAngelo. whose extensive comments have substantially improved the substance 
and exposition of this paper. An earlier version of this paper, entitled ‘The Choice Between Firm 
Commitment and Best Efforts Contracts’ was presented at the Ohio State University Stanford 
University. University of Michigan. University of Minnesota. University of Penns>;lvama, and the 
University of Rochester WERC Conference on Investment Banking and the Capttal Acquisition 
Process in April 1985. This research was partially funded by a summer research fund grant from 
the University; of Michigan Business School. 
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are agreed upon (with the investment banker usually being granted an overal- 
lotment option to sell as many as 15% more shares). Only when the final 
prospectus is issued does the investment banker guarantee to deliver the 
proceeds (net of commissions) to the issuing firm, whether or not the offer is 
fully subscribed at the offer price. Once an offer price has been set, shares 
cannot be sold at a higher price even if demand for the issue is unexpectedly 
strong, although the investment banker is permitted to sell shares at a lower 
price if it breaks the syndicate. 
With a best efforts contract, the issuing firm and its investment banker agree 
on an offer price and a minimum and maximum number of shares to be sold. 
Following SEC approval, the investment banker then circulates a prospectus 
and makes its ‘best efforts’ to sell the shares to investors. During this selling 
period, interested investors indicate interest by depositing money in an escrow 
account established by the underwriter. If the minimum number of shares is 
not sold at the offer price within a specified period of time, usually 90 days, 
the offer is withdrawn, and the investors’ money is refunded, with the issuing 
firm receiving no money. 
Although the costs of going public are on average much higher for best 
efforts offers, this is partly because there are substantial economies of scale, 
and best efforts offers tend to be smaller than firm commitment offers. If issue 
size is held constant, however, best efforts offers still seem to be somewhat 
more costly. This raises the question of why many firms (35.4% of the total in 
the 1977-1982 period) choose to use best efforts contracts, in spite of their 
apparent cost disadvantage. I analyze this contract choice decision, focusing 
on the role of asymmetric information among investors. I discuss the circum- 
stances under which each of the two strategies, firm commitment and best 
efforts contracts. is optimal for the issuing firm. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, descriptive 
statistics for firm commitment and best efforts offers are presented. In section 
3, I analyze Mandelker and Raviv’s (1977) optimal risk-sharing argument for 
the contract choice decision. In section 4, I give an explanation for the choice 
between the two contract types based on asymmetric information among 
investors. Section 5 presents empirical evidence supporting that explanation, 
and the paper ends with a brief summary and discussion. 
2. The characteristics of firm commitment and best efforts offers 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 1,028 firms that were taken 
public by investment bankers in the United States in 1977-1982.i The data are 
’ The data exclude Regulation A offers. for which firms raising less than $1.5 million are eligible. 
The disclosure requirements for Regulation A offers are substantially less than for the S-l, S-2. 
and S-18 ofTers that comprise the sample used here. 
Table 1 
Average gross proceeds. sales. and book values for firms going public in 1977-1982. categorized 
by contract type. 
Firm Best 
All commitment efforts 
offers otTersJ offers 
Average gross proceedsb.’ $6575,616 $8880.906 $2.370.362 
(9.788.007)’ (11.437.137) (2.164.255) 
Average annual sales in $13.144.048 $20.048473 $549.162 
year prior to offerb.d (45.383.358) (55.252680) (2.238.552) 
Average pre-offer S2.928.067 $4.365.539 $305.865 
book value of equityb,’ (7.155.382) (8.557.460) (654.336) 
Number of firms 1,028 664 364 
(percent of total) (100.0%) (64.6%) (35.45) 
Gross proceeds as a 
percent of total 100.0% 87.2% 12.8% 
“Four combined firm commitment-best efforts offers are classified as firm commitment offers. 
bAll of the averages (gross proceeds, sales. book value) are averages of nominal values: no price 
level adjustments have been made. 
‘Gross proceeds are total dollars raised: the offer price times the number of shares sold. 
dSales are the most recent twelve-month revenues reported in the firm’s offer prospectus. 
eBook value is for the most recent date reported in the firm’s offer prospectus. 
‘For the top three categories, the figures in parentheses are the standard deviations. 
described in more detail in Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986). Table 1 
shows that the average firm commitment offer raises almost four times as 
much money as the average best efforts offer ($8.88 million vs. $2.37 million). 
Further, firm commitment offers are used by firms that are. on average, 
substantially larger in sales and book value. Table 1 also shows that while firm 
commitment contracts are used in 64.6% of all offers, they account for 87.2% 
of the proceeds. 
In table 2 I categorize offers by gross proceeds and contract type. As the 
table shows, 72.0% of the offers that raise less than $2 million use a best efforts 
contract, whereas only 2.8% of the offers that raise $10 million or more use this 
contract.’ 
In table 3, I report the direct costs of going public. These include under- 
writer commissions: legal, printin g, and auditing expenses; and other out-of- 
pocket costs. The existence of substantial economies of scale is evident. The 
table 3 evidence indicates that the direct costs of going public are equal to 
‘Other differences between the two contract types include the ‘quality’ of the underwriters 
employed. Only one of the 364 best eiTorts offers in 1977-1982 was conducted by a ‘major 
bracket’ investment banker. Most underuriters restrict themselves to either best efforts or firm 
commitment offers. Another difference is that firm commitment offers are bought primarily by 
institutional investors. whereas best efforts offers are purchased almost exclusively by individual 
investors. 
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Table 2 
1977-1982 initial public offers categorized by gross proceeds and contract type. 












100.000-1.999.999 243 68 175 0.720 
2.000.000-3.999.999 311 165 146 0.469 
4.000.000-5.999.999 156 133 23 0.147 
6.000.000-9.999.999 137 122 15 0.109 
10.000.000-120.174.195 181 176 5 0.028 
All offers 1028 664 364 0.354 
“The gross proceeds categories are based on the nominal values: no price level adjustments have 
been made. 
Table 3 
Direct expenses of going public as a percentage of gross proceeds. 1977-1982. 
Number of Underwriting Other Total cash 


























Best eljorts offers 
175 10.63 9.52 20.15 
146 10.00 6.21 16.21 
23 9.86 3.71 13.57 
15 9.80 3.42 13.22 
5 8.03 2.40 10.43 
364 10.26 7.48 17.74 
“Gross proceeds categories are nominal; no price level adjustments have,been made. 
hThe underwriting discount is the commission paid by the issuing firm: this is listed on the 
front page of the firm’s prospectus. 
‘The other expenses figure comprises accountable and non-accountable fees of the underwriters, 
cash expenses of the issuing firm for legal, printing, and auditing fees. and other out-of-pocket 
costs. These other expenses are described in footnotes on the front page of the issuing firm’s 
prospectus. None of the expense categories include the value of warrants granted to the 
underwriter, a practice that is common with best efforts offers. 
Table 1 
Aberags percentage cash expenses and initial returns. and total transaction costs as a percentage 
of realized market values. 1977-1982. 
Gross proceeds (5)” 
Number of Cash 




costs (4c ld 
F~mt convnr~menr ofers 
100.000- 1.999.999 68 19.48 26.92 31.73 
‘000.000-3.999.999 165 17.43 20.70 24.93 
4.000.000-5.999.999 133 14.77 12.57 20.90 
6.000.000-9.999.999 1’2 12.34 8.99 17.85 
10.000.000-120.174.195 176 9.34 10.32 16.27 
All offers 664 14.03 14.80 21.22 
Besr efforrs offers 
100.000-1.999.999 175 20.15 39.62 31.89 
2.000.000-3.999,999 146 16.11 63.41 36.28 
4.000.000-5.999.999 23 13.57 16.82 14.49 
6.000.000-9.999.999 15 13.22 40.79 25.97 
10.000.000-120.174.195 5 10.43 - 5.42 -0.17’ 
All offers 364 17.74 47.78 31.87 
.‘Gross proceeds categories are nominal: no price level adjustments have been made. 
hThc cash expenses are those reported in table 3. 
L The initial returns are computed as (L‘ - OP) + OP. multiplied by 100°C. where e is the closing 
bid price on the first day of trading and UP is the offer price. These are not annualized returns. 
‘Total costs are computed as 100% minus the net proceeds as a percentage of the market value 
of securities in the aftermarket. Consequently. total costs are not the simple sum of cash expenses 
and the average initial return. 
‘For best efforts offers of $10 million or more. the negative average total costs are due to the 
price declines suffered by several offers. For three of the tive firms in this categorl;. net proceeds 
exceeded the post-offer market value of the securities issued. 
approximately $250,000 plus 7% of the gross proceeds. For an offer of a given 
size, the direct costs are of the same order of magnitude for both firm 
commitment and best efforts offers, although the costs for best efforts con- 
tracts are understated because the value of warrants, which are commonly 
granted to the underwriter, is excluded. Nevertheless, these costs are substan- 
tially higher than those that Smith (1977) reports for seasoned equity issues. 
The direct cost of going public is only one component of the total costs. A 
second cost is the underpricing cost.) (This is known as the money ‘left on the 
table’.) For initial public offers, this is substantial, as reported in table 4. The 
average initial return, defined as the percentage price change from the offer 
price to the first day’s closing bid price, is 14.80% for firm commitment offers 
and 47.78% for best efforts offers. Further, best efforts offers have higher 
“There is another component not dealt with in this paper: management time and effort. No data 
exist on the monetary equivalent of this cost. 
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average initial returns than firm commitment offers in all but the largest of the 
five gross proceeds categories. (In the largest gross proceeds category, there are 
only five best efforts offers.) Thus, while the direct costs of going public are 
comparable for firm commitment and best efforts offers. holding the offer size 
constant, the indirect cost of underpricing is greater for best efforts offers. 
Consequently. the total costs of going public are higher for best efforts offers. 
as shown in the average total costs columns in table 4. 
If best efforts offers are more expensive than firm commitment offers, why 
do over one-third of offers use best efforts contracts? 
3. Optimal risk-sharing as an explanation of the contract choice decision 
One potential reason for choosin, 0 between a firm commitment and a best 
efforts contract, given by Mandelker and Raviv (1977), concerns the optimal 
bearing of proceeds risk, defined as the uncertainty about the amount of 
money being raised. Mandelker and Raviv argue that in a best efforts offer the 
issuing firm bears the proceeds risk, whereas in a firm commitment offer the 
investment banker bears this risk. 
For firm commitment offers, a preliminary prospectus is typically issued 
several weeks before the actual offer. The preliminary prospectus shows 
tentative minimum and maximum offer prices and a tentative number of 
shares to be sold. The actual minimum and maximum number of shares and 
the offer price are determined only at the pricing meeting, which usually 
occurs the day before the offer:4 the offer price and number of shares can be. 
and frequently are, substantially different from those shown in the preliminary 
prospectus. 
In table 5, I present data on just how large these changes are, using offers 
for 1982 only, including best efforts offers that were withdrawn.’ In row 1. I 
have computed the ‘expected’ gross proceeds of $10,159,670 for firm commit- 
ment offers by finding the weights for the minimum and maximum amounts 
from the preliminary prospectus so that the ‘expected’ gross proceeds equals, 
on average, the realized gross proceeds. The last column shows that the 
average absolute percentage change between the actual realized gross proceeds 
and the expected gross proceeds was 23.8% for firm commitment offers. In 
“Most firm commitment offerings give the undewriter an option to increase the number of 
shares above the guaranteed minimum if demand is strong. During the 1977-1982 period. 83.2% 
of the 664 firm commitment offers had an overallotment option allowing the investment banker to 
increase the size of the offer by as much as 10%. In 1983. the SEC began permitting firm 
commitment offers to include an overallotment option of up to 15%. The underwriters normal& 
have 30 days after the otTenng in which to exercise the overallotment option. although it is usuallq 
exercised immediately. 
5 I anal-me only the offers in 1981, rather than 1977-1982. as in the rest of the tables. because of 
the extensive time required to track down and transcribe data from the preliminary prospectuses 
of firm commitment offers and from withdrawn best efforts offers. 
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Table 5 
Mean ‘expected’ and actual gross proceeL ; ’ ’ _~~~rage absolute percentage deciation from 










116 Firm commitment 
offers S10.159.670J $10.159.670 23.88b 
X7 Successful bes: 
efforts offers S 1.908.504“ % 1.908.504 18.2% 
73 Unsuccessful best 
efforts offers’ S 2.6CO.178’ 0 100.0% 
155 Attempted best 
efforts offers 52.234260 $ 1.009.660 56.7% 
“For tirm commitment offers, the ‘expected’ gross proceeds is computed as 0.663 of the 
minimum and 0.337 of the maximum proposed gross proceeds in the prehminaq prospectus. 
These are the weights for the 106 firm commitment offers for which there was complete 
information that make the ‘expected’ proceeds equal to the average realized proceeds. In the 
preliminary prospectus. an offer price range is usually specified, along with a proposed number of 
shares. The minimum proposed gross proceeds is the minimum offer price multiplied by the 
number of shares. The maximum proposed gross proceeds is the maximum offer price multtplied 
bl; the maximum number of shares. assuming that any overallotment option is exercised. 
hInformation on the preliminary; offer pnce range is incomplete for 10 of the 116 firm 
commitment oKers in 1982. Consequently. the average absolute percentage deviation is based on 
onI\ 106 offers. 
“kor best etTorts offers. the ‘expected’ gross proceeds is computed as 0.653 of the minimum and 
0.347 of the maximum number of shares offered times the offer price. These are the weights for the 
82 successful otTers that m&e the ‘expected’ proceeds equal to the average realized proceeds. 
“The 73 withdrawn best efforts offers are those best efforts offers that had effective dates 
between October 1981 and September 1982 and were later withdrawn. Best efforts offers that are 
uithdrawn arc usually withdrawn 3 months after the effective date; reliable data on the exact 
dates the 73 offers were withdrawn are unavailable. 
‘Of the 73 withdrawn best efforts offers. data on the minimum number of shares oRered are 
unavailable for 10. Most of the 10 had registered as firm commitment offers and later switched to 
best efforts offers before being withdrawn. Consequently, the ‘expected’ gross proceeds is based on 
only 63 failed ofTers. 
other words, for a firm that in the preliminary prospectus indicates it will sell 1 
million shares at S9.00-$11.00 a share, it is not at all unusual to have the offer 
scaled back to, say, 800.000 shares at $8.00 or increased to 1.2 million shares 
at S12.00. (The number of shares and the offer price are almost always 
changed in the same direction.) Thus, only a few weeks before the offer, the 
issuing firm has substantial uncertainty about how much money will be 
raised.6 
These revisions are why the investment banker’s guarantee of the proceeds is 
so misleading: the guarantee isn’t made until the final pricing meeting, when 
‘For an account of the process of going public for one company. see Uttal (1986). 
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the investment banker has a good (although not perfect) idea of how much 
money can be raised.’ Consequently, it is rare for investment bankers to sell 
fewer than the guaranteed minimum number of shares at the offer price. 
Practitioners have told me that. at most, only 10% of firm commitment offers 
are not fully subscribed, and even when they aren’t. usually only a small 
fraction of the shares must be sold at a lower price, and it usually isn’t too 
much lower. As a practical matter, the investment banker in a firm commit- 
ment offer bears little risk; essentially all of the proceeds risk is borne by the 
issuing firm. 
The remaining three rows of table 5 contain figures for best efforts offers, 
including 73 failed offers. I have computed the ‘expected’ gross proceeds in a 
manner analogous to that for firm commitment offers. (1982 was somewhat 
unusual, in that an unusually large fraction of best efforts offers failed.) 
Largely because so many offers fail, there is substantial proceeds risk for firms 
attempting to go public using a best efforts contract.* 
In summary, table 5 shows that the issuing firm bears substantial proceeds 
risk for both firm commitment and best efforts offers, although it is higher for 
best efforts offers. Finally, it should be noted that the average absolute 
deviations reported in table 5 are lower bounds to the actual proceeds risk. 
This is because many offers (both best efforts and firm commitment) are 
withdrawn before a prospectus is issued. 
4. An explanation based on asymmetric information among investors 
An implication of Rock’s (1986) model of the underpricing of initial public 
offers. developed in Beatty and Ritter (1986) is that firm commitment offers 
will be underpriced more (in an expected value sense) the greater is the ex ante 
uncertainty about an issuing firm’s value. This occurs because, if potential 
investors have differential information, informed investors impose an adverse 
selection cost on uniformed investors. Since informed investors submit more 
purchase orders for underpriced offers than for overpriced offers, uniformed 
investors wind up being allocated a disproportionately small fraction of 
underpriced offers and a disproportionately large fraction of overpriced offers. 
Consequently, uninformed investors find themselves facing a situation in 
which their expected return conditional on receiving shares is lower than their 
‘As Smith (1986~1. p. 23) notes, the investment banker’s guarantee can be viewed as the granting 
of a put option to the issuing firm. I am arguing that the exercise price of this option is set in a 
manner that makes the value of this put option nearly worthless. Smith (1977, p. 289) makes a 
similar point about the value of this put option for a new issue by a publicly-traded firm. 
‘Typically. tirms whose offers are withdrawn don’t try again. I have found very few instances of 
a best efforts offer being withdrawn in which the firm subsequently went public. If alternative 
sources of financing are not found by these firms, then the net present value of foregone 
investments is an additional cost borne by firms that attempt to raise capital with best efforts 
contracts and withdraw the offer. 
expected return conditional on submittin, 0 a purchase order. The difference 
between these two conditional expected returns becomes larger as the disper- 
sion of possible firm values increases. Thus, uniformed investors will be willing 
to submit purchase orders for more speculative initial public offers only if the 
expected underpricing is greater than for issues for which there is less 
ex ante uncertainty about true firm value. 
With a best efforts offer, if the offer is not fully subscribed, it is withdrawn. 
Thus, the adverse selection problem that uniformed investors face with a firm 
commitment offer is ameliorated. Because uniformed investors do not face a 
severe adverse selection problem for which they have to be compensated, an 
issuing firm does not have to severely underprice its shares, as it would with a 
firm commitment offer. A best efforts offer is not without a disadvantage for 
the issuing firm, however - if the offer is withdrawn, the issuer receives no 
funds. This risk is worth taking only if the reduction in the degree of 
underpricing is sufficiently great. 
With a best efforts contract, the issuing firm finds it optimal to set a 
threshold level of demand high enough that uniformed demand is insufficient 
to fill it. By doing so, the issuer induces uniformed investors to submit 
purchase orders (with their money placed in an escrow account) for a best 
efforts offer with a high offer price, when they would be unwilling to do so for 
a firm commitment offer. Because the issuer precommits to withdraw offers for 
which informed demand is not forthcoming, the issuer can set a higher offer 
price, involving less dilution, than it could with a firm commitment offer. 
Using the above reasoning, Ritter (1987) formally demonstrates that firms 
whose value is more certain will use firm commitment offers, and firms whose 
value is highly uncertain will use best efforts offers. 
5. Empirical evidence 
To test the section 4 prediction relating ex ante uncertainty to the contract 
choice, a proxy for ex ante uncertainty is needed. One observable variable that 
is plausibly related to ex ante uncertainty is the daily standard deviation of 
returns in the aftermarket. It seems likely that firms with volatile stock prices 
are firms whose market value was highly uncertain before public trading 
began. To calculate the daily standard deviation of returns, I use the first 20 
daily closing bid prices in the aftermarket.9 These bid prices are publicly 
available for NASDAQ-listed new issues in Standard and Poor’s Daily Stock 
Price Record for Ouer-the-Counter Stocks. For approximately 10% (primarily 
small offers) of the population of firms mounting initial public offers in the 
1977-1982 period, the Daily Stock Price Record does not have daily price 
‘The NASDAQ National Market Issues listings, where only a closing transaction price is 
reported. rather than the closing bid price. did not begin until 1983. 
Table 6 
Fraction of NASDAQ-listed’ offers in 1977-1982 using best efforts contracts categorized by gross 
proceeds and aftermarket standard deviation. 
Gross proceeds (S? 
Aftermarket daily standard deviation 
Below mediarPd At or above median 
F-statistic’ 
(p-value) 
100.000-l.YYY.999 0.436 0.743 16.23 
( ,I = 55) ( ?I = 109) (O.lxQl) 
2.0(HMOO-3.999.999 0.275 0.557 21.37 
(t2 = 91) (rt=303) (0.0001) 
4.ooO.000-5.999.999 0.026 0.273 20.36 
(n=76) (,I = 77) (O.ocQl) 
6.000.000-9.999.999 0.022 0.273 23.52 
(!I = 92) (n=44) (O.OixU) 
10.000.000-1’0.174.195 0.021 0.054 1.17 
(n = 142) (!I = 37) (0.2816) 
‘Only the 926 NASDAQ-listed offers are used because daily price data are not readily available 
for non-NASDAQ-listed OTC stocks. Of the 926 offers. 641 used firm commitment contracts and 
285 used best efforts contracts. Only 67.5% of offers under $2 million were subsequently listed on 
NASDAQ. compared with 97.1% of offers of $2 million or more. 
hThe proceeds categories are based on the nominal values; no price level adjustments have been 
made. The corresponding table in real terms (not reported here) show a qualitatively similar 
pattern. but the quantitative differences are even stronger than those shown above. 
‘The median daily aftermarket standard deviation is 4.3%. 
‘The average aftermarket daily standard deviation is 4.2% for tirm commitment olTers and 7.6% 
for best eh’orts offers. 
‘The F-statistics test the hypothesis that the mean fraction using best &Torts contracts is the 
same for both high and low aftermarket standard deviation firms. The p-value is the probability 
that the F-statistic would be as large or larger under the null hypothesis that the fraction of offers 
using best eRhrts contracts is unrelated to the aftermarket daily standard deviation category, 
assuming independence of each offer. 
quotations beginning when the stock started trading in the aftermarket. Since 
no other source of daily quotations is readily available for these firms, only 
926 of the total sample of 1,028 firms have been used. 
One potential problem in using the aftermarket standard deviation of 
returns as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty is that this variable is correlated 
with firm size, as measured by the gross proceeds. The simple correlation 
coefficient between the aftermarket standard deviation and the log of gross 
proceeds is -0.31. To control for possible confounding effects, in table 6 I 
report the fraction of offers using best efforts contracts using the same gross 
proceeds categories as in tables 2, 3, and 4. For each gross proceeds category, I 
report the fraction of offers using a best efforts contract for firms with low and 
high aftermarket standard deviations, where the cutoff for these two categories 
is the sample median value of 4.3% per day. 
J. R. Rrrrer, Cosrs o/ goq puhl~ 219 
For all five gross proceeds categories in table 6 the fraction of offers using 
best efforts contracts is higher for firms in the high aftermarket standard 
deviation category than for those with low aftermarket standard deviations. 
The differences are striking: for both the $4,000.000-$5.999.999 and 
$6.000,000-$9,999,999 categories. the fraction of offers using best efforts 
contracts is more than ten times larger in the high aftermarket standard 
deviation category. 
An F-test of the hypothesis that the fraction of firms using best efforts 
contracts is the same for both low and high aftermarket standard deviation 
categories leads to rejection of the null hypothesis at high levels of statistical 
significance for all but the largest gross proceeds category. (In the largest gross 
proceeds category. the small number of best efforts offers makes it difficult to 
reject any hypothesis at conventional levels of statistical significance.) The 
results reported in table 6 strongly support the proposition that firms with 
higher ex ante uncertainty are more likely to use a best efforts contract than a 
firm commitment contract. 
Further evidence supporting the notion that only firms whose value is highly 
uncertain will use a best efforts contract is contained in Booth and Smith 
(1986). Since the ex ante uncertainty about the market price of a stock that is 
currently traded is minimal compared with the uncertainty in most initial 
public offerings, I would predict that few seasoned equity offers use a best 
efforts contract. Using the SEC’s Registration and Offer Statistics (ROS) data 
set for 1977-1982, Booth and Smith report in their table 1 that 54.3% of initial 
public offers of common stock used a best efforts contract, whereas only 2.6% 
of seasoned equity offers used such a contract.” 
I have argued that uniformed investors face less adverse selection risk with 
best efforts offers than with firm commitment offers, because overpriced best 
efforts offers are withdrawn. A literal interpretation of this statement would 
predict that no best efforts offers experience negative initial returns. In 
practice, some do have negative initial returns, possibly because of new 
negative information that arrives toward the end of the selling period. Still, if 
best efforts offers do result in less adverse selection risk for uninformed 
investors, I would expect to see a smaller proportion of best efforts offers than 
firm commitment offers experiencing negative initial returns. In fact, among 
the 1,028 initial public offers in 1977-1982, 24.7% of firm commitment offers 
had negative initial returns, whereas only 16.5% of completed best efforts 
“‘Booth and Smith (1986, table 1) report that 54.3% of initial public offers in 1977-1982 used 
best efforts contracts. whereas table 1 of this paper reports only 35.4% as using a best efforts 
contract. Booth and Smith’s data source (the ROS data set) lists only 396 of the 664 firm 
commitment offers that I have, whereas it lists 470 best efforts offers, as compared to only 364 in 
my data set. In direct inspection of all 1.028 prospectuses in my data set. I found no misclassifica- 
tions of the contract type. In an inspection of the ROS data set, I found numerous misclassifica- 
tions of the contract type. as well as misclassifications of new issues in terms of whether the issue 
&as a seasoned or unseasoned (initial public) offer. 
offers had negative initial returns. This is further indirect evidence consistent 
with the notion that issuing firms are motivated by considerations relating to 
informational asymmetries among investors in choosing the contract form. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper documents the differences in the types of firms using firm 
commitment and best efforts contracts. These differences are striking: small, 
more speculative firms tend to raise small amounts of money using best efforts 
offers, and larger, more established firms tend to raise large amounts of money 
using firm commitment contracts. With either type of contract, the average 
transaction costs are noteworthy: 21.22% for firm commitment offers and 
31.87% for best efforts offers. Although part of the lower average cost for firm 
commitment offers is due to the existence of substantial economies of scale, it 
appears that for an offer of a given size, the total transaction costs for a best 
efforts contract are higher than for a firm commitment contract. Further, the 
proceeds risk borne by the issuin, 0 firm, although substantial with both 
contract types, appears to be much greater for best efforts contracts. Yet many 
firms still choose to use best efforts contracts. I resolve this apparent paradox 
as follows: if there is enough uncertainty about the value of the firm, an 
issuing firm is better off using a best efforts contract because the required 
underpricing if it used a firm commitment contract would be so severe. Using 
a data set of initial public offers from 1977-1982, I find empirical results 
consistent with the theory: firms that are more volatile in the aftermarket are 
more likely to have used a best efforts contract to go public. 
Analyzing the contract choice decision in terms of the effect on the adverse 
selection problem facing investors sheds light on the existence of overallot- 
ment options in firm commitment offers. As mentioned earlier, most firm 
commitment offers include a feature in which the underwriter has the option 
of selling as many as 15% more shares than the guaranteed number. The 
underwriter’s ability to exercise this option for oversubscribed (i.e., undei- 
priced) offers helps to ameliorate the adverse selection problem facing unin- 
formed investors. Consequently, an overallotment option may reduce the 
degree of underpricing required in a firm commitment offer. 
An alternative (although not mutually exclusive) rationale for the existence 
of overallotment options is suggested by Smith (1986b, p. 20). Since the profit 
margin on the commissions an investment banker receives on incremental 
shares sold through the overallotment option is very high, investment bankers 
have an incentive to underprice an offer that includes an overallotment option 
in order to increase the probability of exercising the option. Because of this 
incentive structure, investors can rationally interpret the existence of an 
overallotment option on an offer as indicating a low probability that it will be 
overpriced. 
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When an investment banker takes a firm public. the underwriter is both 
certifying and distributing the issue. As discussed in the introduction. in a best 
efforts offer the offer price is set earlier in the process of going public than in a 
firm commitment offer. With a firm commitment offer, the investment banker 
gathers more information (and, as a byproduct, redistributes it) about market 
demand before setting the offer price than is done with a best efforts contract. 
Thus. a firm commitment offer involves relatively more certification than a 
best efforts offer. This is consistent with the fact that the ‘major bracket’ 
investment bankers almost always do firm commitment offers. 
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